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THE POWERS OF THE THUNDERBIRD: 
THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF THE EMERGENCY STATE* 
Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips 
I try to be a man of peace, but if people tempt me, 
I can be a thunderbird. 
P W Botha, August 1987 
Introduction 
We cannot respond by blind defiance based on the 
view that the state is panic-stricken and all that is 
needed is a big push. Nor can be respond by saying 
that the state's power is unassailable - that it has no 
weaknesses, and that we should retreat into total 
inaction. 
COSATU discussion paper, Special Congress, 1988 
This paper is an assessment of the strategies, structures and resources that the Emergency 
State has deployed to fight its battles on the "political terrain". [l] We intend demonstrating 
that a new set of strategies are being implemented in response to the failure in the face of 
mass resistance of the early "total strategy" reforms. While capital and the popular classes 
have pursued in their own ways a range of strategies to transform apartheid, the state (and the 
interests that dominate it) has been able .to mobilize enormous resources and co-ordinate 
ambitious policies to respond to these challenges. 
By 1988, the state had arrived at a point where political reform had ground to a halt and 
"crisis management" had become its primary strategic concern. In the process, state power 
and executive decision-making became concentrated in the Office of the State President 
(OSP) which, in turn, is increasingly dependent on the National Security Management 
System (NSMS). Recent analyses of state institutions have failed to note the extent to which 
this Office has become the epicentre of an authoritarian power structure [2] that binds 
together in the person of the President the complex security hierarchy, the state departments 
and the facade of consociational parliamentary government. [3] The Office of the State 
President uses as its main instruments of power the cabinet, cabinet committees, the State 
Security Council and the NSMS as mechanisms for ensuring that the policies of the 
Executive President are accepted and implemented. 
State policies and actual outcomes rarely coincide. This is because the state has to do battle 
on a terrain of ongoing struggles, conflicts and contradictions generated both by tensions 
between its own institutions and by challenges and pressures emanating from without. Any 
assessment of the shifting nature of state strategy and the structures it has erected to 
implement these strategies must take cognizance of this social context. [4] 
* Published in South African Review 5: "The Emergency State: its structure, power and limits". 
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The Botha State and Total Strategy 
The highly complex and disorganized decision-making structures of the pre-Botha state, a 
1980 White Paper on Rationalisation argued, "makes it difficult for the central executive 
machinery to act swiftly and effectively to solve problems and crises". [5] By restructuring 
state decision-making structures, this report argued, "a more manageable machinery of 
government to meet new challenges and crises" could be created. [6] 
The reorganization of the state decision-making structures was one aspect of what became 
known during the early 1980s as the "total strategy" programme. Originating in the security 
establishment and the "verligte" wing of the NP, this programme aimed to co-ordinate and 
centralize reform policies and security strategies while streamlining and rationalizing the 
bureaucracy. The reform policies of the early 1980s were supposed to restructure four basic 
social arenas: the work-place, the city, the regional political economies and the 
constitutional order. [7] 
Six components of the broadly defined executive branches of the state were reorganized 
between 1979 and the introduction of the new Constitution in 1983: 
1) the Department of the Prime Minister was turned into the Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM) and given extended powers exercised through its various 
"planning branches" responsible for all key aspects of policy making [g]; 
2) the National Intelligence Service (NIS) replaced the Bureau of State Security; 
3) cabinet committees, working groups for cabinet committees, and a cabinet l 
I secretariat were introduced [9]; 
4) the state departments were reorganized and reduced in number [l01 and a new 
department, the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, was 
created to manage the macro-planning of reform policies [l l]; 
I 
, 5) the Senate was abolished and a President's Council (PC) established to work 
out a new constitutional dispensation [12]; 
6) the State Security Council was turned into a powerful policy-making body and 
the embryo of a complex national, regional and local system of committees 
was set up underneath the SSC - the so-called National Security Management 
l System (NSMS) [l31 - see diagram. 
The reorganization of the central decision-making structures prepared the way for the highly 
I centralized and constitutionally sanctioned authoritarianism of the Executive Presidency that was created by the 1983 Constitution. [l41 
Proceeding from the assumption that the state was faced with a "total onslaught" aimed at 
undermining all levels of society, the new P W Botha administration moved swiftly to 
1 implement a "total strategy", with three goals [15]: 
I 
* to maintain state security 
* reform the political environment, and 
* co-ordinate all state action. 
"Total strategy" planners identified four areas of "reform": the legalization of black trade 
unions through the Wiehahn Commission; the recognition of the permanence of urban 
blacks in line with the recommendations of the Riekert Commission; the formulation and 
implementation of a new constitution that brought Indians and coloureds into parliament as 
junior partners; and the introduction of a new regional development policy to co-ordinate 
industrial development planning in accordance with depoliticized regional boundaries rather 
than racially determined constitutional divisions. This involved the division of South Africa 
into nine "development" regions for the purpose of integrated "development planning". [l61 
The internal logic of "total strategy" reforms was coherent and premised on a specific 
perception of South Africa's social reality. The Riekert Commission's assumption was that 
bantustans could be retained but that, in response to the unrest of 1976-77, "urban blacks" 
must be recognized as permanent members of the cities and towns. 
Once "urban rights" had been conceded by the Riekert Commission, then a range of other 
complementary rights necessarily followed: rights to form trade unions, purchase property, 
sell labour on a "free urban labour market" without a contract, and trade. The municipal 
franchise was seen as the ultimate embodiment of the new "urban identity". Blacks were 
given, for the first time ever, fully autonomous municipal institutions - the Black Local 
Authorities - with extensive urban powers (e.g. allocation of housing and trading sites). 
The new urban policy created several critical problems that soon contributed to black protest. 
First, because it wanted to create a privileged elite of "urban insiders" divorced from the 
poverty of the rural masses, it required an intensification of influx control - hence the 
proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill of 1982. Second, the 
Black Local Authorities, as a form of local political self-government, were designed to be 
financially self-sufficient, even though they were excluded by the Group Areas Act from 
access to rateable commercial and industrial property. Third, because the BLAs' only link to 
higher forms of representation was through the bantustans, the issue of the overall 
illegitimacy of state constitutional reform was exacerbated. 
The constitutional reforms were premised on the consociational theory that "group identities" 
in multi-cultural societies must be protected but that structures for "CO-determination" and 
"joint decision-making" must also be created. The result for whites, coloureds and Indians 
was the creation of a new "consociational contract". 
As far as the majority African population was concerned, the new regional development 
policy rested on the principle of "economic interdependence and political independence", or 
what the Buthelezi Commission called the "soft-borders approach". Bantustans would 
proceed to independence and then enter into a supra-state agreement to form a "confederation 
of Southern African states". 
In summary, "total strategy" may have left many fundamentals of apartheid intact (e.g. 
bantustans, influx control and constitutional exclusion of Africans from central government), 
but it did introduce significant modifications to some basic institutions of political society. 
These institutions regulated access to three social arenas: the city, the factory and 
government. In reality, however, the maximum the white minority was prepared to concede 
in the early 1980s fell far short of the minimum the black majority was prepared to accept. 
In the end, "total strategy" failed because its idealistic intentions were thwarted by a 
sustained period of black resistance. This resistance exacerbated, highlighted and brought to 
the fore the key structural contradictions that original "total strategy" reforms failed to 
address. 
As far as urban policy was concerned, the attempt to drive a wedge between "urban insiders" 
and "rural outsiders" by intensifying influx control was challenged and made unviable by 
two social movements. The first and most important was the squatter struggles. Displaying 
desperate and relentless determination to escape grinding rural poverty and live in urban 
areas, squatter communities broke through the urban wall and illegally invaded land to secure 
their right to urban existence. 
The labour movement also helped undo the "rural-urban" divide. By organizing migrant 
workers and urban proletarians into single industrial trade union organizations committed to 
joint wage demands, the intention to create two entirely separate labour markets - one urban 
and privileged and the other rural and cheap - was severely undercut. 
The local government system that was supposed to bind the new urban system together was 
soon in ruins. Because the state insisted that councils should raise their own finance for 
development, councillors were forced to increase rent and service charges. Their low levels 
of legitimacy meant that neglecting development altogether was simply no: an option. They 
needed to demonstrate the benefits of participation. The increases, however, triggered a 
nation-wide popular rebellion that began in the Vaal townships in September 1984 and 
spread across the country. By mid-1985 most Black Local Authorities had collapsed because 
of mass resignations or because councillors had been killed by residents. 
Fiscal unviability was not the only problem. The root cause of the depth of popular protest 
was the fact that the local franchise was not tied to a programme for granting full political 
rights to blacks. This facilitated the emergence through the local community organizations of 
a national political organization - the United Democratic Front - committed to the total 
dismantling of Apartheid and the creation of a non-racial democracy. [l71 
The new labour dispensation failed to achieve its objectives. When the unions threatened to 
oppose the legislation because migrants were excluded from the right to join unions, the state 
backed down and extended the definition of "employee" to include migrant workers. 
The consociational contract foundered on the rocks of popular resistance expressed through 
the election boycotts of 1984. The confederal schema also began to come apart at the seams. 
The steady political and fiscal decline of model bantustans like Ciskei, Transkei and 
Bophutatswana made it abundantly clear that separate development and the grand vision of a 
Confederation of States was turning into a nightmare. 
In short, "total strategy" inadvertently created spaces for the initiation and deepening of mass 
democratic mobilization and organization. By granting industrial rights, unions were 
spawned that challenged relations in the factories, cities and political society. Opening up 
the urban system generated urban movements that politicized civil society and destroyed the 
cornerstones of the Riekert policy framework. And constitutional reform provided the focus 
for national organization and resistance on a scale not seen since the 1950s. All these 
manifestations of resistance and opposition short-circuited key state strategies and prepared 
the way for new ones. 
Intense struggles were fought within the state during the 1985-86 period over what was to 
replace the failed policies of "total strategy". In some ways these struggles reflected the 
influence of big business on state policies. These interests responded to the failure of reform, 
township unrest, the politicization of the work-place, and economic recession by pressurizing 
government in both public and private ways to move beyond the original parameters of the 
"total strategy" programme. The campaign against influx control spearheaded by the Urban 
Federation is the best example. The public tone of business politics in 1985-86 reflected the 
urgently felt need in these quarters for policies that would deracialize the capitalist system. 
[l81 
In other ways, these struggles also reflected competing intra-state conceptions of how to 
protest the generalized interests of the white minority. 
Struggles within the State 
The failure of the "total strategy" reforms immediately created the need amongst state 
planners for the formulation of alternatives. The formulation of alternative policies, 
however, did not take place in a vacuum. It is now generally accepted that the state is not a 
unified monolith. [l91 Different branches of the state were interfacing with the black 
communities on different levels and interpreting the challenges from below in different ways. 
To understand state responses to the contradictory consequences of their own strategies, a 
picture of the balance of institutional interests within the state is required. 
At this point the three most important institutional forces within the state that had a say in the 
formulation of alternatives to "total strategy" were the OSP, the Department of Constitutional 
Development and Planning (DCDP), and the security establishment. The DCDP was, until 
early 1986, the flagship of reformist policy-making. It was this department that formulated 
both the early "total strategy" reform programmes and the 1985-86 extended reform policies 
that moved the state well beyond its initial reform goals. However, the security 
establishment was also emerging with strategies of its own to defuse the crisis. In the end, as 
we will show, it was when the OSP came down decisively in favour of the security 
establishment's proposal that the state defend itself by means of "counter-revolutionary 
warfare" methods, that the balance of institutional forces within the state shifted decisively 
against the DCDP. 
The DCDP was created in 1982 under Minister Heunis. Its institutional foundations were the 
"planning branches" that had been created in the Office of the Prime Minister in 1980. Each 
"branch" dealt with a specific field of state action: physical planning, economic policy, 
constitutional development, security planning, social planning and scientific planning. The 
transfer of these branches to the newly created DCDP in 1982 (except for the security 
planning branch, which became the secretariat for the SSC) turned it into the engine-room of 
government policy-making and strategic thinking. It was here that overall macro- 
coordination of all the major state reform actions during the 1982-85 period took place, e.g. 
the new constitution, the restructuring of local government, the new regional development 
policies, the population development plan, and the urbanization strategy. [20] 
Proceeding from the assumption that more concessions would satisfy black demands and 
legitimize state strategies, the political reformers in the DCDP responded to black rejection 
of reform by extending the reform programme. There were five critical moments in the 
extension of this programme: 
* in November 1984, Minister Heunis announced that Black Local 
Authorities were to be included into the proposed Regional Services 
Councils 
* in May 1985 Stoffel van der Merwe published his National Party 
pamphlet, entitled "... and what about the Blacks?", which argued 
that homelands were a failure; 
* in September 1985 P W Botha announced that citizenship would be 
restored to all Africans residing permanently in "South Africa"; 
* in late 1985 P W Botha conceded that the tri-cameral parliament was 
not the final solution, merely a step in a process; 
* in September 1985 the President's Council published its report on 
urbanization, which culminated in the December 1985 statement by 
Heunis that blacks would be given freehold property rights and in the 
1986 Abolition of Influx Control Act. 
All these extensions of the reform programme were ad hoc responses to popular pressure 
from political movements, business organizations, the international community, trade unions, 
squatters and township organizations, and the deepening sense of crisis. These shifts 
unintentionally undid existing policy positions without being coupled to a coherent set of 
alternatives. [21] 
The extension of the reform programme during this period met with the strategic 
requirements of the "counter-insurgency" framework that was still dominant at the time. In 
an address to the Institute of Strategic Studies in 198 1, ex-police commissioner General 
Johann Coetzee isolated five key elements of the "counter-insurgency" position [22]: 
* 
"a dynamic policy of change" to "make the RSA a difficult target 
to pin down for assault"; 
* 
"a clear political objective ... to ensure a free, independent and 
united country"; 
* 
"propaganda ... directed at the counterinsurgents, the population 
and the insurgent"; 
* the avoidance of conflict and defusing of "explosive situations"; 
and 
* 
"an effective information organization and spy network". 
"Counter-insurgency", he said, "is based on the cornerstone of information or intelligence." 
Yet, by mid- 1986, it seemed to many in the security establishment - and elsewhere in the 
state - that the "dynamic policy of change" embodied in the reformist policies pursued in the 
1978 to 1986 period had failed to defuse conflict. Decimation of the spy network through 
attacks on informers, moreover, had undone the very cornerstone of "counter-insurgency". 
To increasingly assertive security hard liners, the democratic opening which reform 
previously provided had to be closed and "counter-insurgency", with its bias toward political 
solutions based on good intelligence, replaced with a far more thoroughgoing and co- 
ordinated programme that would crush the democratic opposition, "counter-organize" the 
communities and upgrade socio-economic conditions. 
The National Security Management System (NSMS) is the structure of unified command 
which has been activated to co-ordinate the implementation of this new strategy. Although 
established silently in the wings right at the outset of the post-1978 period [23], the NSMS 
was not initially fully activated or turned into the nerve centre of state action that it has now 
become. Instead, it was created as a fall-back in case the formal civilian structure collapsed 
or proved unable to govern the country on its own. During the heyday of "total strategy" in 
the early 1980s the officials who staffed the NSMS, to quote one former state official, "were 
just keeping the seats warm". [24] The turning point came in May 1986 when P W Botha 
and the generals decided to scuttle the EPG Mission's proposals by bombing three capitals of 
the front-line states. Instead of negotiating with the black opposition (as Chris Heunis's 
department was beginning to do at the local level), the state moved to smash it by declaring a 
National State of Emergency and activating the NSMS at all levels. In the words of one ex- 
security policeman, "when the moment came, all we needed to do was to hit the switch". [25] 
"Hitting the switch" meant turning the NSMS shell into a crisis management machine. As 
will be shown below, the pre- 1986 organization of the NSMS was, in the words of a reliable 
pro-government intelligence source, "found to be lacking as far as proper communication and 
control channels were concerned, apart from the fact that it was designed for a totally 
different function and was not geared for the day-to-day running of the Emergency". [26] 
The NSMS was "structured as a separate arm of government" [27], under the auspices, 
direction and effective control of the OSP. Before discussing the specific operation of and 
strategies implemented by the NSMS, an analysis of the structure of the OSP is required. 
Office of the State President 
The OSP has become the epicentre of state power. [28] No major macro-policy decision is 
taken without the President's personal approval or direct involvement in its formulation. US 
political scientist Samuel Hunfington's 1981 proposition in Politikon, that the "route from a 
limited uni-racial democracy to a broader multi-racial democracy could run through some 
form of autocracy" [29], has become an accurate reflection of how centralized executive 
power has become. The OSP has managed to achieve this by subordinating key executive 
structures to itself, taking direct control of some executive powers and then rooting itself in 
the "crisis management" functions of the NSMS. This is the best method, Deputy Minister 
Leon Wessels argued, of dealing with "the question of political power" because "one of the 
most important principles of counter-revolutionary action is that unity of purpose within the 
framework of a co-ordinated plan is essential". [30] This view was echoed in a Department 
of Military Intelligence booklet which concluded its analysis of "counter-revolution" with a 
quote from one-time commanding officer of British forces in Malaya: 
Any idea that the business of normal government and the business 
of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good 
and all. The two activities are completely and utterly inter-related. [31] 
The OSP consists of a number of committees, advisers, secretariats and Ministries that deal 
with public administration, public expenditure priorities, constitutional affairs, economic 
policy, socio-economic development ("welfare"), propaganda and national security. The 
most important of these are the President's immediate advisers, the National Priorities 
Committee, Commission for Administration, Information Ministry, National Intelligence 
Service (NIS), Welfare Secretariat, Economic Advisory Council (EAC), and the National 
Joint Management Centre (NJMC). 
The Director-General of the OSP, Jannie Roux, and other close advisers employed by the 
OSP are significant because access to the President is channelled through them. They have a 
say on who reaches the President and on what information he acts. 
The Welfare Secretariat, that is now directly controlled by the staff of the OSP, emerged out 
of changes to the cabinet committee system. The three cabinet committees for constitutional, 
social and economic matters initially comprised the relevant Ministers and senior state 
officials. Each committee had a working group comprising the officials on the cabinet 
committees. Since 1986, the officials have been squeezed out of the cabinet committees and 
a welfare secretariat controlled directly by Jannie Roux has been created to administer the 
functioning of the "welfare" cabinet committees. This has placed the macro-coordination of 
non-security policy in the hands of a secretariat that is directly controlled by the OSP. The 
cabinet is merely the political structure that is supposed to legitimize this decision-making 
process. 
Up until 1986, the OSP co-ordinated the activities of the welfare departments and the 
security establishment via the National Coordinating Committee (NCC). After the 
declaration of the State of Emergency, this overall co-ordinating function was transferred to 
the newly activated NJMC that fell directly within the NSMS. When the NCC co-ordinated 
welfare and security functions, the OSP was probably using it simply to facilitate liaison 
between the two arms of the state. However, when the NJMC took over this role, co- 
ordinating these two arms became a critical component of the "crisis management" system. 
It also meant that the OSP became more directly involved in the day-to-day management of 
the Emergency state and it did so by routing itself to the NSMS. 
The National Priorities Committee, originally established in 1984 to oversee the design of the 
Budget, has taken over economic policy-making functions that were previously the 
responsibility of the Department of Finance, EAC, and the Central Economic Advisory 
Service. The National Priorities Committee makes all the key decisions about how the state 
spends public money in the context of sanctions and deepening recession. In particular, it is 
this committee that balances the competing but complementary demands of defence and 
socio-economic upgrading. 
The Commission for Administration (CFA) is an extremely powerful tool, answerable to the 
President. Its 1000 employees design organizational plans to ensure the effective 
implementation of executive decisions. The CFA is entitled to issue orders that Ministers 
and Directors-General are obliged to carry out. Although it handled 21 1 investigations into 
bureaucratic restructuring in 1987 alone, its major task at the moment is to execute the 
privatization programme. The CFA falls under the Minister in the OSP entrusted with 
Administration and Privatization. 
The NIS, with its 5000 employees under Director-General Neil Barnard, is responsible for 
intelligence interpretation and evaluation. The OSP relies heavily on the NIS for assessments 
and analysis of security-related issues and for the formulation of counter-strategies. 
The Ministry for Information in the OSP under Minister Stoffel van der Merwe regulates and 
controls the communication activities of all government departments. The Bureau for 
Information is involved at all levels in what one official called the "war of words" - an 
essential component of the "counter-revolutionary" strategy. The Bureau's involvement in 
the Communication Committees of the JMCs links the OSP directly to grassroots propaganda 
efforts. The Bureau claims that its publications, including 45 township newspapers, have a 
readership of 2.5 million people. 
Although the OSP has always been central to the new constitutional system, during 1987-88 
its power and significance became more pronounced. This was particularly apparent in the 
way the President unilaterally reconstituted the EAC in mid-1986. Prior to 1986, the EAC 
was the most important institutional link between organized business interests and the state. 
It included representatives of business organizations, academics, top officials and cabinet 
ministers, and it was chaired by Dr Simon Brand of the Development Bank. In mid-1986 
P W Botha announced that most of the officials and academics were to be excluded from the 
EAC and that from then on he would personally appoint the business representatives. Those 
who have been appointed are the leading lights of monopoly capital. 
In business circles, there are different interpretations of the changes in the EAC. While some 
see it as evidence of a deepening alliance betwen big business and the state, a more widely 
held view is that the changes have resulted in a downgrading of the influence of organized 
capitalist interests. As far as the state is concerned, the EAC is one of a number of forums 
where it would like to consolidate an alliance with monopoly capital around common 
interests in deregulation, privatization, sanctions busting, urban development and economic 
reform in general. (The other forums include, for example, the Joint Liaison Forums, the 
Panel of Business Leaders attached to the CFA, the Secretariat for Unconventional Trade, 
Defence Manpower Liaison Committees, and occasional business summits.) This is part of 
the state's view that business has a responsibility to play a leading role in the economic and 
welfare components of the "counter-revolutionary" effort while leaving security and 
constitutional matters to the state. 
In short, the OSP has emerged as the lynchpin of key strategic thinking and action. The co- 
ordination of all the policy functions outlined above falls directly under its control and 
purview. By 1988 this office and its incumbent had become the most decisive decision- 
maker in the state - a level of power centralization not uncommon in societies going through 
a violent interregnum. 
"Counter-Revolutionary Warfare" 
The implementation of the "counter-revolutionary warfare" strategies through the NSMS has 
involved four significant changes: 
(a) the establishment of a new structure of centralized command under the direct 
purview of the OSP, i.e. the NJMC; 
(b) the deployment of new security personnel in key positions in the system (Africa Confidential, 10.1 1.1986,8.7.1987, 10.6.1987, 17.6.1988). 
(c) a vast increase in the numbers of people drawn into the system at JMC, 
sub-JMC and mini-JMC level [32]; and 
(d) the imposition of a new theory of state action, i.e. "counter-revolutionary 
warfare" in order to "win-hearts-and-minds" ("WHAM"). [33] 
The "counter-revolutionary warfare" position replaced the "counter-insurgency" ("COIN") 
perspective that former security police chief General Johan Coetzee propounded in the early 
1980s. "Counter-insurgency" was seen to have no answer to the unprecedented scale of the 
1984 to 1986 uprising, or to the powerful local and international pressures for fundamental 
change. By mid-1986, the hard liners' advocacy of an alternative strategy designed to break 
the opposition and rebuild support bases for the state enabled them to force the scuttling of 
the EPG Mission in May 1986 and the declaration of a permanent national state of 
emergency. 
Unlike "counter-insurgency", which concentrated on intelligence gathering while leaving 
politics to the civilians, "counter-revolutionary war" involved the security establishment in 
countering the revolutionary strategy at every point. It relegated the politics of reform to a 
matter of, at best, secondary importance, to be dealt with at some point in the future. The 
immediate task was to secure the security of the state; or, as the DMI booklet put it, "To 
defeat the revolutionaries and ... regain the initiative". [34] 
The new 'ccounter-revolutionary" strategists - the so-called "securocrats" - proceeded from 
three basic points of departure [35]: 
* first, law and order must be restored before reforms can be introduced; 
* second, socio-economic development, or what P W Botha called 
"social reform", must precede political reform [36]; 
* third, constitutional development must begin at local level and 
proceed upwards to higher levels. 
"Re-establishing law and order" involved the declaration of what has effectively become a 
permanent State of Emergency and the detention of around 30,000 people, the banning of 34 
organizations, widespread vigilantism, and the silencing of leaders and alternative 
newspapers. [37] 
A laqje-scale socio-economic upgrading programme has been launched in the most 
troublesome black townships. Thirty-four of the most volatile townships - the so-called 
"oilspots" - have been earmarked for special attention. [38] About 1,800 urban renewal 
projects are currently in progress [39] in approximately 200 townships countrywide. R300 
million will be spent by the thirteen TVL RSCs. [40] Official sources have claimed that R34 
billion will have to be spent on housing development over the next twenty years. [41] 
P W Botha criticized sanctions on the grounds that it would deprive black townships of R9.5 
billion for socio-economic upgrading over the next ten to fifteen years. [42] The Department 
of Development Planning spent R59 million on upgrading during 1986187 and R57 million 
was budgeted for 1987188. The Development Bank spent R2.4 billion on services and 
housing during 1984-87. Budgets for the three model "oilspots" are: Crossroads - R90 
million; Alexandra - R95 million; Mamelodi - R 410 million (including housing). 1431 
Unfortunately, no precise total expenditure figures for the upgrading programme as a whole 
have been given by the authorities. 
The sources of funding for this urban development programme include the Development 
Bank, Regional Services Councils, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 
Provincial Administrations, South African Development Trust, South African Housing Trust, 
Urban Foundation, private sector companies, Department of Finance, and local authorities. 
Reliable sources have confirmed that special funding for upgrading is also being channelled 
through South African Defence Force budgets. The Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, 
Jan Lombard, estimated in 1988 that R4.5 billion per annum is needed until the year 2000 to 
finance a large-scale "settlement programme" for blacks. This, he argued, was R3.3 billion 
more than the R 1.2 billion currently invested in this area by the public and private 
sectors. [44] 
As far as political reform is concerned, the logic of the "counter-revolutionary warfare" 
strategy implies that only when security actions have run their course, grievances addressed, 
and municipal government restored, will political reform again become an issue on the 
agenda. 
The "counter-revolutionists" argued that, to be successful, the security upgrade strategy had 
to fall under centralized command and be tightly co-ordinated. Their chosen instrument was 
the NSMS. The most decisive institutional expression of their new ascendancy in the state 
was the establishment and activation of the National Joint Management Centre (NJMC) in 
the heart of the NSMS (see diagram). Through the NJMC, the security establishment was 
entrusted for the first time with the co-ordination of both security and welfare decision- 
making functions. 
The NJMC is chaired by Deputy Minister of Law and Order Leon Wessels, and is 
responsible for the daily management of the State of Emergency. Its headquarters are located 
in Tuynhuis. Under the direct guidance of the OSP, the NJMC co-ordinates state action at all 
levels. The NJMC has a "Nationale Staatkundige, Ekonomiese en Maatskaplike Komittee" 
("SEMKOM") to co-ordinate welfare policy and a "Gesamentlike Sekuriteits Kornmittee" to 
co-ordinate security strategies. 
The State Security Council (SSC) is at the apex of the NSMS. It brings together the most 
important of the cabinet ministers and the country's security chiefs. Its regular members are 
the state president (the chairman); the minister of defence; the ministers and directors- 
general of the departments of Law and Order, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Constitutional 
Development, and Justice; and a few politically important cabinet ministers such as 
F W De Klerk. The SSC is a macro-policy making body and not in direct daily control of 
Emergency management. As the previous section suggested, the OSP is more important than 
the SSC when it comes to the running of the NSMS. 
The security officials on the SSC are the chief of the SADF (General Jannie Geldenhuys) and 
the chiefs of the army (Lt-General Kat Liebenberg), navy (Vice-Admiral Glyn 
Syndercombe), air-force (Lt-General Jan van Loggerenberg), and medical services 
(Lt-General Daniel Knobel); the directors of the National Intelligence Service and of 
military intelligence (Neil Barnard and Lt-General C J van Tonder); the commissioner of 
police, Major-General Hennie de Witt, and the chief of the security police, Major-General 
Johann van der Menve; the director of security legislation, Andre Bosch, and the director- 
general of the state president's office, Dr Jannie Roux (Africa Confidential, 8.7.87). Of the 
23 permanent members of the SSC other than the state president, twelve are security 
officials. The SSC .is also able to co-opt on to itself for the purpose of specific discussions 
any other cabinet minister, senior civil servant, or even industrialists such as the chairman of 
Arrnscor. It meets fortnightly, on a Monday night, the night before cabinet, which meets on a 
Tuesday. It assesses, t?om a security perspective, all executive decisions of state and decides 
on matters as fundamental as the Angola-Namibia peace settlement and the "invasion" of 
Bophuthatswana - a "foreign country" - to rescue its president from a coup bid. 
The SSC is backed up by the four legs of the NSMS. The Work Committee, which provides 
expert back-up to the SSC, consists of the heads of government departments represented on 
the SSC and the heads of the other three cabinet committees (the committees for social, 
economic and constitutional affairs, now subsumed under the welfare secretariat). Support to 
the Work Committee and the SSC is given by the secretariat of the SSC. The personnel of 
the secretariat are drawn from the following departments: SADF - 70 per cent; NIS - 20 per 
cent; and Foreign Affairs - 10 per cent. [45] It is responsible for intelligence interpretation, 
strategic communication, strategy formulation and administration of the security 
management system. In addition, there are thirteen inter-departmental committees that have 
been created to ensure the co-ordination of departmental resources and activities. As the 
definition of security has broadened to include the management of most conceivable 
problems and processes, so the official designation of the system itself is beginning to change 
to simply the National Management System. [46] This suggests that the NSMS is no longer 
regarded as simply a temporary measure but that this "structure could become a permanent 
feature of government". [47] 
The real life-blood of the NSMS is its fourth leg - the network of over 590 regional, district 
and local Joint Management Centres (JMCs). The NJMC co-ordinates the activities of both 
the welfare and security secretariats above it, while attempting to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the hundreds of committees below it. The latter include: 
* eleven JMCs which divide the country into management regions 
corresponding to SADF area commands and, roughly, to the nine 
economic development regions; 
* sixty odd sub-JMCs, with some having borders that correspond to 
the Regional Services Councils; and 
* at the local level somewhere between 250 and 500 mini-JMCs and 
Local Management Centres which co-ordinate state action in almost 
every settled community in the country. 
These co-ordinating structures bring together military, police and civilian officials, usually 
under the chairmanship of a senior military or police officer. The functions of a JMC and the 
essence of the "counter-revolutionary warfare" strategy are apparent in each MC's  
committee structure. Although there are frequently local variations in their precise make-up, 
most, whether they are the NJMC, regional JMCs or local mini-JMCs, have four functional 
committees and a co-ordinating executive with representatives of each on it. These four 
committees are the intelligence committee, the security committee, the welfare committee, 
and the communications committee. In many ways, the functions of these committees mirror 
the concentration of power at the highest level in the OSP, which centralizes a similar set of 
functions: co-ordination, intelligence, security, welfare, and communications (see diagram 
2). 
Each intelligence committee gathers and interprets the intelligence on which co-ordinated 
state activities are based. Staffed by representatives of military intelligence, the security 
police and the National Intelligence Service, it seeks to promote unity of effort between these 
traditionally competing intelligence agencies. The security committee, the repressive arm of 
the NSMS, acts on the intelligence provided by the intelligence committee. Staffed by a 
combination of riot police officers, military officers, security branch officers and officers of 
the municipal police, of the kitskonstabels, and of commando and civil defence units, it co- 
ordinates the implementation of security strategies laid down by the SSC. 
The welfare committee, on the other hand, takes responsibility for co-ordinating the functions 
of the civilian administration. Though at the national level this includes the co-ordination of, 
for example, constitutional and labour issues, at most levels welfare implies a particular 
concern with local upgrade programmes. Its membership consists of officials of the various 
non-security state departments, e.g. roads, education, welfare, health, constitutional 
development, transport services, the Provinces' community services offices, etc . More than 
anything else, the welfare committee tries to prioritize development projects, cut red tape, 
unblock bottlenecks, and generally ensure that things get done. 
The functions of the security committee and the welfare committee - the two essential arms 
of the system - encapsulate the overall intentions of state security strategists. These are, to 
use the words of Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok, to "take out", "eliminate" or 
"annihilate" activists, on the one hand, while, on the other, "addressing grievances". [48] 
The overall national security management strategy is sold to the public via the fourth of the 
JMC's committees, the communication committee (Komkom). The KomKoms are run by 
the Bureau for Information, though SADF communications operations (comops) personnel 
and public relations personnel from other government departments do play some role. There 
is sometimes a clear overlap of personnel between SADF and Bureau officials. The Bureau's 
national head of planning and research, for example, is a senior military intelligence officer, 
Major-General P J Groenewald (Africa Confi&ntial,8.7.1987). 
Komkom attempts to do three things. Firstly, through the co-ordination of lectures, 
television programmes, pamphlets, newspaper articles and the publication of local 
newspapers, it aims to explain and justify action taken against activists and opposition 
organizations. Secondly, Komkom aims to ensure the maximum publicity for welfare-type 
projects and government-supporting "counter-organizations". Wherever possible, credit for 
JMC co-ordinated programmes will be taken by "civil bodies" such as Black Local 
Authorities. At the same time the sincerity of state reforms is widely publicized both inside 
and outside the country. The third apparent function of the Komkoms is the co-ordination of 
disinformation via a variety of media forms, pamphlets and township graffiti. [49] 
The JMC system has contact with the public informally through talks and lectures on the 
nature of the counter-revolutionary war given by JMC officials. The head of the strategic 
communication branch of the SSC secretariat once claimed to have given "about a thousand 
lectures" on the system in a six-year period (Worsnip, 1988: 98). A more formal 
relationship between the public, the business community and the security system is being 
formed through a network of Joint Liaison Forums, Joint Liaison Committees, and Defence 
Manpower Liaison Committees (Demalcoms). These allow the security establishment to 
market their strategies to influential members of the public and to broaden their informal 
sources of information and support. [50] 
The secretariat of the SSC is the only part of the NSMS which employs full-time staff. This, 
in fact, is one of the major strengths of the system. At all other levels it relies exclusively on 
officials co-opted from the various state departments themselves. This means that decisions 
and recommendations of the NSMS at all levels are the decisions and recommendations of 
senior officials of these departments, rather than being policy imposed from the outside. Just 
as it is highly unlikely that the cabinet will override the carefully considered and security 
assessed decisions of the SSC, so it is equally difficult for any single government department 
to ignore plans formulated in the JMCs. 
Conclusion 
This paper has med to trace the evolution of the structures and strategies of what we have 
called the Emergency state. Its responses to pressures within the white power bloc and 
challenges from below in the ,black communities have been twofold: firstly, it has changed 
strategic tack in search of new solutions; and, secondly, it has adapted its power structures to 
manage and co-ordinate resources under emergency conditions. In the process, an 
authoritarian decision-making structure emerged, with the State President at its epicentre and 
the security system operating as its most important executive arm. 
The "total strategy" package was adopted in the early 1980s because it was both a set of 
means and a coherent conception of ends. The ends comprised a grand reformist vision of a 
stable multi-ethnic society coupled to a set of means that believed that reform could be 
managed from above by carefully deploying the finely honed instruments of state power. In 
the end, "total strategy" failed because the state proceeded from the assumption that it was 
neutral and above social conflict and could, therefore, define solutions as if the apartheid 
state form itself was not the cause of the problem. 
The explosion of mass resistance from 1984 onwards not only led to the collapse of the pre- 
1984 reform policies, but directly challenged the apartheid state form itself. It was in direct 
response to this threat that the State of Emergency was declared and the "counter- 
revolutionary warfare" strategies implemented. The point is, however, that these strategies 
are largely reactive means designed to defend state power. It is now opcnly admitted by the 
state that, short of "surrender", it has no coherent conception of a blueprint or vision of how 
the fundamental political conflict can be resolved. Despite Law and Order Minister Vlok's 
claim at the Natal NP Congress in 1988 that the state has a coherent "masterplan" for 
resolving this conflict (The Star, 19.9.1988), the Emergency state and its structures are 
involved in little more than the business of long-term "crisis management". 
Although the strategies of the Emergency state are having profound social and political 
effects, the outcomes of state actions do not correspond to the intentions of policy-makers. 
Vlok's "masterplan" will more than likely founder on the rocks of racial oppression, limited 
resources and ongoing resistance. 
The official position of the National Party government remains the insistence that, in 
P W Botha's words, "as far as I am concerned, I am not considering even to discuss the 
possibility of black majority government in South Africa". [5 l] Preventing this outcome 
remains, in essence, the purpose of "counter-revolution" in South Africa. Yet, in at least 
three instances elsewhere in the world where "counter-revolutionary warfare" strategies have 
been used to counter essentially national struggles (i.e. Vietnam, Algeria, and Malaya), in the 
end the basic demands of nationalism had to be met. In South Africa, the complete absence 
of any constitutional resolution to the "national question" will guarantee continued mass 
resistance to white minority rule. 
Furthermore, at a time when the Emergency state needs to finance rising security expenditure 
and the expensive "winning-hearts-and-minds" programme, there are increasing constraints 
on the national resource base. Sanctions, economic recession, political unrest and declining 
investment will exacerbate this structural limitation on the scope of state action. There is no 
evidence that the economy will achieve the 5-7 per cent growth rate that Reserve Bank 
Deputy Governor Jan Lombard recenty argued is required to finance the socio-economic 
upgrading programmes. [52] 
Finally, the survival of mass opposition in the communities, schools and work places during 
the Emergency era calls into question the confident claims by security officials that the State 
of Emergency has succeeded in "eliminating the revolutionaries". Even they concede that 
there is "still a revolutionary climate". 
This term is taken from S Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa: Political 
Considerations (Manchester, 1982). We are not concerned with the relationship 
between state and capital or with the structural question of the relations between 
capitalism and apartheid. Our concern is more descriptive and focussed on specific 
state strategies that have emerged out of its attempts to resolve the fundamental 
political conflict between the white minority and the oppressed majority. Nolutshungu 
uses the concept of "political terrain" to refer to those actions by the state that are not 
directly reducible to class interests. The interests of the white minority are reflected in 
their purest and most concentrated form in the racially exclusive practices of the state. 
This has been the underlying determinant of state action during a decade of 
unprecedented challenges from below by the black majority. 
For a state to be legitimate, the right of its apparatuses to regulate society as a whole 
needs to be broadly accepted at the level of civil society. Only then will the struggle 
for public power in political society reflect general aspirations, grievances and interests. 
This condition of "hegemony" occurs when, in Gramsci7s words, "spontaneous consent 
[is] given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on 
social life by the dominant fundamental group". However, in authoritarian societies, 
this hegemony is absent and therefore compliance is obtained by "the apparatus of state 
coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 
'consent' either actively or passively". In what Lowy and Sader call "predominantly 
coercive statesy7, with reference to the Latin American context, the non-coercive 
institutions "have found themselves displaced by or absorbed within the repressive 
apparatuses, in particular the armed forces". 
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